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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the inception of consumer protection laws, the cornerstone of
common-law consumer protection litigation was caveat emptor¾“let the
buyer beware.”1 Under this standard, aggrieved consumers were forced to
rely on common-law fraud claims when seeking relief for any

*J.D., 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1 Joanna Shepherd, The Expansion of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act: Causes and
Consequences,
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http://www.civiljusticenj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/14Oct_Shepherd_TheExpansionO
fNJCFA_CausesAndConsequences.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
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misrepresentations regarding the nature or quality of goods they purchased.2
While common-law fraud claims theoretically provided consumers an
avenue for redress, the requirements to obtain such relief created a strenuous
uphill battle for plaintiffs.3
The common-law fraud requirements reflected “assumptions about the
symmetry of the consumer-merchant relationship.”4 It was assumed that
consumers and merchants had equal bargaining power and were on a level
playing field.5 These assumptions, however, were undermined at the turn of
the twentieth century, when the scales began to tip in favor of sellers.6 The
growing complexity of consumer products left buyers unable to determine
the quality and nature of the products they were purchasing.7 Conversely,
sellers became larger, more sophisticated, and further removed from their
consumers.8 This changing relationship between manufacturers and
consumers created a belief among the general public that manufacturers, who
were now dealing with product disputes internally, were escaping liability
for unfair practices.9
Seeking to address the growing power imbalance between consumers
and sellers, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC
Act”) in 1914.10 The FTC Act created the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC” or the “Commission”) and gave the FTC the power to define what
constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” in or affecting
commerce.11 Additionally, the FTC Act gave the FTC the authority to
protect consumers against such unfair or deceptive acts or practices.12
Recognizing that “unfair and deceptive acts or practices” could include a
wide variety of commercial dealings, Congress limited the law’s
enforcement by: (1) allowing only the FTC to sue under the FTC Act, and
(2) limiting the FTC’s relief to injunctive relief.13 While the FTC Act was
initially well-received, it was soon viewed as ineffective due to political
2 Id. (stating that “[c]ontract and tort law provided some remedies for major breaches of
the merchant-consumer relationship, with aggrieved consumers resorting to fraud claims for
misrepresentations as to the nature or quality of purchased goods for single transactions.”).
3 Id. (requiring that common-law fraud claims are: “an intentional misstatement of fact
delivered with the purpose of deceiving the victim, the victim’s justified reliance, and
demonstrable damages . . . .”).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 4.
7 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 4.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 5.
12 Id. (internal citations omitted).
13 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 5.
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influence, mismanagement, lack of direction, and confusion regarding the
Commission’s consumer protection mission.14 In response, several states
adopted their own consumer protection laws in the 1960s and 1970s.15
New Jersey enacted one of the first state consumer fraud statutes in the
nation.16 In 1960, the New Jersey Legislature passed the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act (the “NJCFA” or the “Act”), which prohibited “fraud,
deception, false promises, and similar misrepresentations or omissions.”17
The NJCFA allowed the state Attorney General to “investigate unlawful
practices and seek injunctions and restitutions for violations of the consumer
fraud statute.”18 In 1971, the New Jersey Legislature amended the NJCFA,
adding provisions allowing for private causes of action by individual
consumers, and mandating treble damages against parties found in violation
of the Act.19
Following its 1971 amendment, the NJCFA gained a reputation as one
of the strongest consumer protection statutes in the United States.20 Liberal
interpretations of the NJCFA by New Jersey state courts strengthened and
broadened the application of the Act’s provisions.21 This broad application
of the Act has been criticized by many in the legal community, who view it
as an invitation to bring excessive, and sometimes frivolous, litigation into
the state’s courts.22 Critics of the Act asserted that New Jersey’s judiciary
interpreted the Act to apply outside of the state.23 “Many New Jersey courts
have ruled that the [NJ]CFA affords a claim to residents of other states, for
transactions occurring in other states, simply because the defendant is
headquartered in New Jersey.”24 This interpretation of the Act has been
criticized because it allows a statute intended to protect New Jersey
consumers to instead benefit out-of-state consumers and lawyers “at the
expense of New Jersey businesses and employees.”25
14

Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47,
47 n.1 (1969)).
15 Id. at 5–6.
16 Id. at 6.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Lisa J. Trembly & Michael F. Bevacqua, Back to the Future with the Consumer Fraud
Act: New Jersey Sets the Standard for Consumer Protection, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 193,
197 (2004) (citing Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999)).
20 Id. at 194 (citing Press Release, Governor William T. Cahill, Assembly Bill No. 2402
(June 29, 1971)).
21 Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 257 (2002) (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 (1994)).
22 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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Interpreting the NJCFA to apply nationwide has created a loophole that
upsets the statute’s balance of “consumer-protecting benefits” against
“commerce-restraining costs.”26 In 2010, the New Jersey Legislature
recognized the need to close this loophole and proposed an amendment to
the Act.27 The amendment would have placed “jurisdictional limits on the
events giving rise to claims that consumers can bring under the [A]ct.”28 It
would have also “narrow[ed] the statute’s application to only those claims
arising out of transactions that occurred in [the] state.”29 However, both
proposed amendments, N.J. A.B. 3333 and N.J. S.B. 2855, progressed no
further than introduction to the Assembly Committee on Consumer Affairs
and the Senate Committee on Commerce, respectively.30 Thereafter, neither
bill was ever voted on.31
However, in the Legislature’s 2018 session, a similar bill, N.J. A.B.
303, proposed to, among other things, amend the Act and limit individual
causes of action solely to New Jersey residents.32 This bill would limit
application of the NJCFA “only to New Jersey residents, or to transactions
that take place in the State.”33
This note will discuss why the Legislature’s newly-proposed
amendment to the NJCFA should be signed into law. The proposed
amendment would prevent out-of-state residents from filing claims against
companies headquartered in New Jersey for transactions occurring outside
the state. Such an amendment is needed now more than ever, with consumer
fraud litigation related to the sale of prescription opioids increasing across
the country.34 Without the protection of an amendment to the NJCFA, such
litigation would be especially problematic in New Jersey, the epicenter of
the global pharmaceutical industry.35
Part II of this note will examine the NJCFA: discuss its legislative
26

Id.
Lisa Ann T. Ruggiero & Erica R. Stein, N.J.’s Consumer Fraud Act: A Runaway Train,
N.J.L.J. (June 8, 2011), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1202496524907/?slreturn
=20171010164657.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 A.B. 3333, 2010 Leg., 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010); S.B. 2855, 2010
Leg., 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010).
31 A.B. 3333, 2010 Leg., 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010); S.B. 2855, 2010
Leg., 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010).
32 A.B. 303, 2018 Leg., 218th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
33 Id.
34 David Schwartz, David Talarico & Giovanni Ciavarra, Opioid Litigation: What’s On
The Horizon, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/955070/opioidlitigation-what-s-on-the-horizon.
35 NJ & Pharmaceuticals: New Jersey Leads the World, NEW JERSEY BUSINESS ACTION
CENTER (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nj.gov/njbusiness/documents/industry/Pharma.pdf.
27
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history, specific provisions, available damages, and the requirements for
private causes of action by consumers. Part III will discuss the provisions
that differentiate the NJCFA from other state consumer fraud acts, and
decisions by New Jersey courts that have applied the NJCFA
extraterritorially. Part IV will explore the potential ramifications that
nationwide application of the Act would have on the state’s pharmaceutical
industry and judicial system, given the current increase in opioid litigation.
It will also argue why an amendment restricting consumer fraud claims to
transactions occurring in the state is necessary considering the
aforementioned concerns.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT
A. The Act’s Legislative History
In 1960, the New Jersey Legislature first passed the NJCFA.36 The
Legislature’s intent in passing the Act was “to address sharp practices and
dealings in the marketing of merchandise and real estate whereby the
consumer could be victimized by being lured into a purchase through
fraudulent, deceptive, or other similar kinds of selling or advertising
practices.”37 At its inception, only the state Attorney General could enforce
the Act.38 “The original Act gave the Attorney General the exclusive
authority to investigate unlawful practices and to obtain injunctions against
any persons engaging in, or about to engage in, unlawful practices and to
seek restitution parens patriae for those individuals harmed by the unlawful
acts.”39
Eleven years later, the Legislature amended the Act, and transformed it
into one of the most consumer-friendly fraud protection statutes in the
country.40 The most significant changes of the 1971 amendment were
provisions that: (1) allowed individual consumers to bring private causes of
action, and (2) instituted mandatory treble damages.41 Private causes of
action allowed victims of consumer fraud to be compensated for the losses
they suffered, which meant that aggrieved consumers would no longer need
36

Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 196.
Id. (citing Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 271 (1978)).
38 Id. (citing Daaleman, 77 N.J. at 271) (emphasis added)).
39 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 9; see also Richard C. Ausness, Prescription Drug Abuse:
The Law’s Struggle to Address an Epidemic: The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1146 (2014) (“In a parens patriae action,
the state contends that it has standing to sue to protect its ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests. A quasisovereign interest is one that is distinct from the interests of particular parties and includes
such things as an interest in the health and well-being¾both physical and economic¾of its
residents in general.”) (internal quotations omitted).
40 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 196.
41 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.11–2.12 (West 2004)).
37
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to rely solely on the Attorney General for relief.42 Treble damages were also
now available to punish the perpetrators of fraud and prevent them from
engaging in further fraudulent behavior.43 It was thought that treble damages
would benefit injured consumers by making consumer fraud cases more
attractive for attorneys to take on.44
Notably, there are fundamental differences between actions brought by
the Attorney General and private actions brought by injured consumers.45
For one, in private actions, plaintiffs have a greater burden to show that they
have standing.46 Consumers must show an “ascertainable loss” of money or
property to have standing to bring a consumer fraud action.47 Conversely,
the Attorney General can sue for purely injunctive relief, bringing suit to
enjoin the offender from going forward in violation of law.48
Concerning violations, a seller violates the NJCFA when it commits an
“unlawful practice” against a consumer.49 The Act explicitly defines what
an unlawful practice is and indicates that there are several ways in which a
seller can commit an unlawful practice.50 For example, it is an unlawful
practice for someone to operate under a name or in a manner which would
lead a consumer to believe they are affiliated “with a department or agency
of the federal or state government” when, in reality, no such affiliation
exists.51 Unlawful practices can also be committed in other ways, including
mislabeling Kosher foods or making improper representations regarding
used cars.52
The 1971 amendment expanded the scope of what constitutes an
“unlawful practice” to include “unconscionable commercial practices.”53
While “unconscionable commercial practices” are not defined in the Act,
New Jersey Supreme Court jurisprudence defined it as “an amorphous

42

Id. at 197 (citing Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999)).
Id.; see also Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “treble
damages” as “[d]amages that, by statute, are three times the amount of actual damages that
the fact-finder is owed.”).
44 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 197.
45 Id.
46 Id. (citing Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 257 (2002)).
47 Id; see also Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC., 183 N.J. 234, 248 (2005)
(defining “ascertainable loss” as the type of damage that can be quantified or measured).
48 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 197; see also Injunction, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “injunction” as “[a] court order commanding or
preventing an action.”).
49 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 197.
50 Id. at 199.
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.1 (West 2016).
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-64 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-68 (West 2016).
53 D’Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. Super. 11, 24 (App. Div. 1985).
43
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concept obviously designed to establish a broad business ethic.”54 The New
Jersey Supreme Court also interpreted the term “unconscionable” as
suggesting a “lack of good faith, honesty in fact, and observance of fair
dealing.”55 Despite the aforementioned guidance from the state’s judiciary,
there are no bright-line rules for when a seller commits an unlawful
practice.56 Instead, what constitutes an unlawful practice is a fact-sensitive
determination that is judged on a case-by-case basis.57
B. The Act’s Provisions
The NJCFA applies to “all consumer transactions that involve the sale
of consumer merchandise or services generally sold to the public at large.”58
The Act forbids the commission of an “unlawful practice,” which is defined
as follows:
[T]he act, use or employment, by any person of any
unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing
concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale
or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the
subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or
not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged
thereby is declared to be an unlawful practice . . .59
The Act’s terms and purposes were drafted to be intentionally broad in
order to encompass a wide scope of activities.60 “Merchandise” includes
“any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services, or anything offered,
directly or indirectly to the public for sale.”61 A “sale” is defined as “any
sale, rental or distribution, offer for sale, rental or distribution or attempt to
54 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 197 (citing Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522
(1971)).
55 Id. at 197–98 (citing Kugler, 58 N.J. at 543).
56 Id. at 198.
57 Id. at 198–200 (“Pursuant to the Act, the Division of Consumer Affairs has enacted
extensive regulations to govern many of the practices susceptible to consumer-fraud
violations, such as home-improvement contracts. Specific regulations adopted by the
Division which govern the conduct of certain businesses include: Deceptive Mail Order
Practices; Meat Sales; Banned Hazardous Products; the Delivery of Household Furniture and
Furnishings; Merchandise Advertising; Servicing and Repairing of Home Appliances; the
Sale of Animals; Unit Pricing of Consumer Commodities in Retail Establishments; Disclosure
of Refund Policy in Retail Establishments; Home Improvement Practices; Resale of
Entertainment Tickets; Sale of Food Represented as Kosher; Deceptive Practices Concerning
Watercraft Repair; Toy and Bicycle Safety; Health Club Services; Motor Vehicle Advertising
Practices; Automotive Sales Practices; and Automotive Repairs.”).
58 Id. at 198–200.
59
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 (West 2016).
60 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 198 (citing New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper,
203 N.J. Super. 486, 499 (App. Div. 1985)).
61 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(c) (West 2016)).
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directly or indirectly sell, rent or distribute.”62 “Persons” are “any natural
person or any business entity such as partnerships, corporations, companies,
associations, etc.”63 At its core, the Act seeks to prohibit fraud.64 As they
have with the Act’s other terms and provisions, New Jersey’s courts have
expansively interpreted the definition of “fraud.”65 It is understood to
include “any misrepresentation or knowing omission of a material fact
regarding the sale of merchandise with the intent that the consumer will rely
upon the misrepresentation or omission.”66
The Act specifically prohibits unlawful practices and unconscionable
commercial practices “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any
merchandise or real estate.”67 Unlawful practices come in three forms: (1)
an affirmative act; (2) a knowing omission; or (3) a violation of an
administrative regulation.68 Regardless of the type of unlawful practice, the
“capacity to mislead” is a central tenet of each action that the court
examines.69 Notably, only the potential for a consumer to be misled is
required to find that a seller committed an unlawful practice. There is no
requirement that a seller actually mislead a consumer.70
Unlike the capacity to be misled, the requirement of scienter differs for
each type of unlawful practice. “Scienter” is “a degree of knowledge that
makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or
omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly, especially as a
ground for civil damages or criminal punishment.”71 When a seller’s
unlawful practice is an affirmative act, there is no scienter requirement
necessary to prove that the seller committed an unlawful practice.72 To have
a consumer fraud claim, the injured consumer must merely show that he or
she sustained an ascertainable loss from the seller’s action.73 However, the
scienter requirement is essential for such a claim if the unlawful practice by
omission.74 To succeed on a claim of unlawful practice by omission, a
consumer must show that the seller intentionally made an omission.75

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(e) (West 2016)).
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(d) (West 2016)).
Id.
Id.
Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 198.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2016)).
Id. at 199 (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 17 (1994)).
Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 17).
Id. at 199 (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 16).
Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 199 (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 17–18).
Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 17–18).
Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 18).
Id. at 199 (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 18).
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Finally, there is no scienter requirement when a seller violates “regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General.”76 Strict liability also attaches to
violations of regulations that the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs
implements.77 Therefore, in the final situation, a consumer must only prove
that the seller violated one of these regulations to succeed on a consumer
fraud claim.78
Once it is determined that a seller committed a consumer fraud
violation, the Act lays out specific provisions for damages. The NJCFA
provides for both remedial and punitive damages.79 Remedial damages are
available to compensate the victim for their loss and make them whole
again.80 Punitive damages, on the other hand, are intended to punish the
seller for his or her wrongdoings and deter them from engaging in future
deceptive practices.81 In this domain, the NJCFA allows for the mandatory
imposition of payment for treble damages, attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and
costs upon parties in violation of the NJCFA.82
Though the NJCFA is regarded as one of the most consumer-friendly
consumer fraud statutes nationwide, there are some limitations that preclude
consumers from bringing actions under the Act. For one, the Act itself
imposes a six-year statute of limitations that prevents consumer suits brought
under the NJCFA after the statute has run.83 Additionally, New Jersey’s
“Entire Controversy Doctrine” could effectively bar a consumer fraud action
under the NJCFA. The “Entire Controversy Doctrine” states that “a party
must assert all claims against all parties in a single judicial proceeding if the
claims or parties have a material interest in the same series of transactions.”84
Therefore, a litigant who does not bring a consumer fraud claim when suing
for another cause of action may be unable to bring a consumer fraud action
sometime in the future.85 It should also be noted that courts are barred from
raising consumer fraud claims sua sponte.86 A court raises an issue sua
sponte without prompting or suggestion from counsel.87 Therefore, a court
may permanently bar consumer fraud claims if a plaintiff fails to raise them
76

Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 18–19).
Id.
78 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 199.
79 Id. at 200 (citing Weinberg, 173 N.J. at 249).
80 Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 21).
81 Id. at 200 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2016)).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 203 (citing Mirra v. Holland Am. Line, 331 N.J. Super. 86, 90 (App. Div. 2000)).
84 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 203 (citing K-Land Corp. No. 2 v. Sewerage
Auth., 173 N.J. 59, 70 (2002)).
85 Id. (citing Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180, 190 (1996)).
86 Id.
87 Sua Sponte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
77
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in a pending action.88
III. HOW THE NJCFA DIFFERS FROM OTHER STATE CONSUMER FRAUD
ACTS
A. Mandatory Treble Damages and Attorneys’ Fees Without Proof of
Ascertainable Loss
The NJCFA’s provision for mandatory treble damages sets it apart from
many other state consumer fraud acts.89 While other state consumer fraud
acts typically allow for treble damages, these damages are granted at the
discretion of the court in some or all situations.90 New Jersey judges,
however, do not have this same discretion.91 This is because the NJCFA is
one of the only state consumer fraud statutes that requires the imposition of
treble damages.92
The NJCFA also deviates from other state consumer fraud statutes in
its handling of attorneys’ fees. While other states permit courts to award
attorneys’ fees, the NJCFA is unique in that New Jersey courts automatically
award attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff, so long as a that plaintiff can prove an
individual or entity committed an unlawful practice.93 Notably, to encourage
consumers to bring good faith claims, plaintiffs can still recover attorneys’
fees and equitable relief even if they ultimately fail to prove a quantifiable
loss.94 Therefore, to receive attorneys’ fees and equitable relief, a plaintiff
must only show: (1) a good faith claim of ascertainable loss, and (2) the
commission of an unlawful practice.95
B. International Union v. Merck and Potential for Nationwide
Application of the NJCFA
Though the provisions for mandatory treble damages and the ease with
which plaintiffs can recover attorneys’ fees sets the NJCFA apart from other
state consumer fraud statutes, the Act’s most significant departure from
similar consumer fraud statutes is its potential for nationwide application.
88 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 203 (citing Prevratil, 145 N.J. at 190); see
also R. Wilson Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Wademen, 246 N.J. Super. 615, 619 (App. Div.
1991).
89 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 10.
90 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11; see, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2583(b) (West 2017);
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (LexisNexis 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B)
(West 2017).
91 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11.
92 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2016)).
93 Id. at 10–11 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19).
94 Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 201 (citing Weinberg, 173 N.J. at 251).
95 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Weinberg, 173 N.J. at 253).
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New Jersey’s Appellate Division has held that consumers can sue under the
NJCFA for transactions occurring in other states, so long as the defendant is
a business headquartered or based in New Jersey.96 Most other states restrict
suits under their consumer fraud statutes to resident-plaintiffs when conduct
occurring outside of the state is at issue.97 On the other hand, the NJCFA
“has never included a nexus requirement,” so “the alleged misconduct need
not have occurred in New Jersey.”98 Because the alleged misconduct can
occur anywhere in the United States, an increase in “litigation tourism” has
plagued the state.99
Both New Jersey’s state and federal courts have examined the
extraterritorial application of the NJCFA, primarily as a choice of law issue
in class-action suits. In some cases, application of the Act to a nationwide
class action is contingent on whether the court certifies a class.100 The
Appellate Division applied the application of the NJCFA to a nationwide
class action suit extensively in International Union of Operating Engineers
Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc.101
International Union was one of many Vioxx litigation cases that took
place in the mid-2000’s.102 The plaintiff in International Union alleged that
Merck, the pharmaceutical company that manufactured and marketed Vioxx,
a prescription anti-inflammatory drug, “fraudulently misrepresented and
suppressed material information regarding the drug and its comparative
safety and efficacy as compared with traditional competitors.”103 The
plaintiff further claimed that Merck specifically targeted third-party health
insurance payors across the country with false marketing, advertising, and
promotions to justify the high cost of Vioxx when compared to similar
drugs.104 Because of the alleged nationwide marketing and sales efforts, the
plaintiff sought to certify a class consisting of all “third-party non-

96 Id. (citing Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co.,
Inc., 384 N.J. Super. 275, 305 (App Div. 2006), rev’d, 192 N.J. 372 (2007)); see also, Elias
v. Ungar’s Food Prods., Inc., 252 F.R.D. 233 (D.N.J. 2008).
97 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11; see, e.g., Goshen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d
1190, 1195 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that a deceptive practice must occur in New York to file
under the Consumer Fraud Act); Avery v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 853 (Ill.
2005) (limiting causes of action under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to transactions in the
state); Marshall v. Priceline.com Inc., No. 05C-02-195 WCC, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 447,
at *5–6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006) (determining that Delaware’s consumer fraud statute
is not applicable outside of the state).
98 Ruggiero & Stein, supra note 27, at 2.
99 Id.
100 Int’l Union, Inc., 384 N.J. Super. At 275.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 281–82.
104 Id. at 282.

D’ALIA (DO NOT DELETE)

1/24/19 6:37 PM

120

[Vol. 43:1

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

government payors [in all States and the District of Columbia] who have paid
any person or entity for the purchase of [Vioxx].”105
On appeal, Merck argued (1) that the trial judge did not properly certify
a nationwide class, given its conclusion that common issues of law or fact
among the class’s members predominated; and (2) that the court should
decide the consumer fraud dispute itself under the NJCFA.106 The Appellate
Division upheld the Law Division’s class certification, as well as the
application of the NJCFA to the class-action.107
The court buttressed its decision to apply the NJCFA to the dispute by
looking to: (1) the NJCFA’s legislative intent, and (2) the process in deciding
which state’s law should apply to each member of the class in its
predominance determination.108 The court stated that the Act’s legislative
history supported a nationwide application of the NJCFA.109 The legislative
history showed that the Legislature intended to make it “one of the strongest
consumer protection laws” in the country.110 It also indicated that there is
“little doubt that the New Jersey Legislature intended its Consumer Fraud
Statute to apply to sales New Jersey sellers made even if the buyer is an outof-state resident and some aspect of the transaction took place outside of
New Jersey.”111
Aside from looking to the Act’s legislative history, the court’s
predominance analysis further supported the notion that the NJCFA should
apply to all members of the nationwide class.112 In order for a group of
people to obtain a class certification in New Jersey state court, four general
prerequisites must be met:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of claims or defenses of the class, and . . . (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
105

Id.
Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 275.
107 Id. at 305.
108 Id. at 292–93.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 287 (citing New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 203 N.J. Super. 486, 501–02 (App.
Div. 1985)).
111 Id. at 288 (citing Boyes v. Greenwich Boat Works, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547
(D.N.J. 1998)).
112 N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-1(b)(3) (regarding “predominance,” the New Jersey Court rules state
that “[a]n action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of paragraph (a) [of
New Jersey Court Rule 4:32] are satisfied, and in addition . . . the court finds that the questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy . . . .”
106
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interests of the class.113
In addition to these general prerequisites, other requirements must also
be met by a plaintiff seeking to certify a class. The additional requirements
at issue in this case concern predominance and superiority, namely: (1)
“whether the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and (2)
“that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.”114
A critical aspect in determining whether a plaintiff satisfies this
predominance requirement is discerning which state’s law should be applied
to the members of the class.115 The court uses a “flexible governmental
interest analysis” when deciding which law should apply in a multi-state
dispute.”116 Such an analysis seeks to apply the law of the state which has
the greatest interest in governing the ultimate issue of the lawsuit.117 The
governmental interest test requires two steps: (1) “determining whether there
is an actual conflict between the laws of the states involved,” and (2) if there
is such a conflict, “identify[ing] the governmental policies underlying the
law of each state and how those policies are affected by each of the state’s
contacts to the litigation and to the parties.”118 Regarding the second step,
the qualitative, rather than the quantitative, nature of the contacts is relevant
to the analysis.119
The Appellate Division upheld the Law Division’s finding that the
differences between the NJCFA and other state consumer fraud statutes were
sufficient to constitute an actual conflict.120 Agreeing with the Law Division
that there was an actual conflict, the Appellate Division then turned to the
second step of the analysis: identifying the governmental policies behind
each state statute and how each state’s contact to the action and parties
implicates those policies.121 A state does not have an interest in applying its
law if that state’s contacts with the action are unrelated to the policies
underlying its statute.122
The courts consider several contacts relevant when examining
113

Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 284 (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-1(a)).
Id. (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-1(b)(3)).
115 Id. at 292 (citing Fink v. Ricoh Corp., 365 N.J. Super. 520, 568 (Law Div. 2003)).
116 Id. at 293 (citing Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 94 (2002)).
117 Id.
118 Id..
119 Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 293.
120 Id. at 293–94 (discussing differences regarding private causes of action, the scope of
transactions actionable, scienter, etc. as sufficient to constitute actual conflicts with the
NJCFA).
121 Id. at 294.
122 Id.
114
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consumer fraud cases: “the place of injury; where the conduct causing injury
took place; the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
the place of business of the parties; and where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.”123 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws provides further guidance in fraud and misrepresentation cases.124 The
court considers certain contacts in determining which state has the most
significant relationship to the matters and parties in situations where the
plaintiff’s actions in reliance on a fraud or misrepresentation were made in a
different state than where the false representations were made.125 These
contacts include:
(a) the place . . . where the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the
defendant’s representations, (b) the place where the plaintiff
received the representations, (c) the place where the defendant
made the representations, (d) the . . . place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, (e) the place where a tangible thing
which is the subject of the transaction between the parties was
situated at the time, and (f) the place where the plaintiff is to render
performance under a contract which he has been induced to enter
by the false representations of the defendant.126
While the place where the defendant made his or her false
representations is relevant, “it is as important a contact in the selection of the
law governing actions fraud and misrepresentation as is the place of the
defendant’s conduct in the case of injuries to persons or tangible things.”127
The Appellate Division in International Union held that New Jersey’s
contacts in this case were extensive and substantial enough to give the state
a far more substantial interest in this litigation than any of the other states.128
The court noted that, among other things: Merck is a New Jersey corporation
located in New Jersey; Vioxx research, development, and testing occurred in
the state; the alleged fraud was envisioned and effectuated in the state; senior
directors overseeing the development of the drug were located in New
Jersey; a board of scientific advisors who expressed concerns about the drug
was located in New Jersey; and parties compromised the clinical studies in
question in the state.129 In contrast, the court deemed that “the contacts each
prospective member of the plaintiff’s class has had with [the] litigation relate
123

Id. at 295 (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 145 (Am. Law Inst. 1971)).
Id.
125 Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 295 (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §
148(2)(a)–(f) (Am. Law Inst. 1971)).
126 Id. (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 148(2)(a)–(f) (Am. Law Inst.
1971)).
127 Id. at 297 (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 148 (Am. Law Inst. 1971)).
128 Id. at 297–99.
129 Id. at 297.
124
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to the receipt of the alleged fraudulent communications and the resulting
economic loss.”130 The court reasoned that, by applying the NJCFA to this
action, the court did not undermine the other states’ interests.131 The court
also explained that, while it is rare to certify a nationwide class-action
applying one state’s law, it is not unprecedented.132
While the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division’s certification
of the class and application of the NJCFA in International Union, the New
Jersey Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded the decision.133
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reasoning for this decision
revolved around the class certification issue, rather than extraterritorial
application of the NJCFA.134 Both parties sought to make the choice of law
analysis the focal point of their arguments on appeal, but the court declined
and more generally analyzed the questions of predominance and
superiority.135 Ultimately, despite strong arguments regarding the choice of
law question, the court “express[ed] no view on the Appellate Division’s
choice of law reasoning or the result it reached as to the applicability of [New
Jersey] law to all members of a nationwide class.”136 Therefore, the potential
for nationwide application of the NJCFA remains intact, despite the reversal
of International Union on other grounds.137
Other state consumer fraud acts contain provisions, such as those
proposed by the New Jersey Legislature, which limit out-of-state consumers
130

Id.
Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 298 (“Application of New Jersey law will not
undermine other states’ interests in compensating their injured residents because that interest
is not actually implicated or compromised by allowing a consumer fraud action brought by
non-residents of New Jersey to proceed against a New Jersey corporation.”) (internal citations
omitted).
132 Id. at 303–04; see, Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 92 Cal. App. 4th 224, 243 (Ct.
App. 2001) (indicating in a similar class action to Int’l Union, the California court stated that
its “more favorable laws may properly apply to benefit nonresident plaintiffs when their home
states have no identifiable interest in denying such persons full recovery” when the fraud
claims originated in California); Clark v. TAP Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 343 Ill. App. 3d
538 (Ct. App. 2003) (A case where the Illinois appellate court affirmed certification of a
nationwide class of “[a]ll individuals or non-ERISA third-party payor entities in the United
States who paid any portion of the 20% co-payment or deductible amount for beneficiaries
under the Medicare Part B for [prescription drug] Lupron . . .” because of “[t]he practical
effect of applying Illinois law . . . to control conduct within the boundaries of Illinois, namely,
the reporting by the defendants, headquartered in Illinois, of a deceptively inflated price for
Lupron to uniformly defraud Medicare and its beneficiaries.”).
133 Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 192
N.J. 372, 372 (2007).
134 Id. at 376 (concluding that “the [Appellate Division] erred in finding that common
questions of law or fact predominate and that a class action would be superior to other
mechanisms for adjudicating the claims.”).
135 Id. at 387–88.
136 Id. at 388 n.3.
137 Id.
131
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to relief for transactions occurring within the state. For example, the New
York Court of Appeals determined that the language of New York’s
Consumer Protection Act only addresses consumer fraud violations
occurring within the state.138 The Supreme Court of Illinois, also citing to
the language of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, stated that it was only
applicable to transactions occurring within Illinois.139
IV. THE NEED TO AMEND THE NJCFA WHEN CONSIDERING THE
RAMIFICATIONS OF OPIOID LITIGATION
A. The Opioid Epidemic and Related Litigation
The United States is currently in the throes of an opioid epidemic
unprecedented in its scope and severity.140 The statistics available on the
nationwide opioid epidemic paint a disturbing picture of what has become
the norm for many individuals in American society. The use of opioid drugs
has increased dramatically over the past few decades.141 Most experts trace
the origin of the epidemic to the introduction of OxyContin, a slow-release
opioid painkiller purportedly safe for long-term use.142 In the time since
OxyContin’s introduction and the market approval of similar prescription
opioid painkillers, over 2.4 million individuals in the United States have
developed opioid use disorders.143 Of those 2.4 million people, ninety-one
die each day from an opioid-related overdose.144 Despite the great dangers
associated with opioid abuse, the number of prescriptions for opioid
painkillers continues to increase daily.145 Compounding the crisis is the

138

Goshen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 324–26 (2002) (“The reference
in section 349 to deceptive practices [in New York’s Consumer Fraud Act] in ‘the conduct of
any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state
unambiguously evinces a legislative intent to address commercial misconduct occurring
within New York . . . Thus, to qualify as a prohibited act under the statute, the deception of a
consumer must occur in New York.’”).
139 Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 180 (2005) (explaining that
the phrase “wherever situated” in the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act definition of “trade” and
“commerce” refers to “any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and any
other article, commodity, or thing of value” and not to fraudulent transactions, limiting the
scope of the Act to consumer transactions occurring in the state).
140 HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency to Address National Opioid
Crisis, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (November 16, 2018, 11:23 PM),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/26/hhs-acting-secretary-declares-public-healthemergency-address-national-opioid-crisis.html (stating that in 2017, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services declared the national opioid crisis a public health emergency).
141 Schwartz, Talarico, and Ciavarra, supra note 34.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.

D’ALIA (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NJCFA

1/24/19 6:37 PM

125

ready availability of heroin across the nation.146 Most opioid users turn to
heroin to fuel their addiction once legal opioids become unavailable or
prohibitively expensive.147 Consequently, the number of heroin users and
heroin-related deaths has risen sharply, and in-step with the increasing
number of opioid prescriptions.148
Such a widespread increase in prescription opioid abuse has opened the
door to a titanic number of opioid-related litigation actions. Plaintiffs who
have used prescription opioids are now filing lawsuits against
pharmaceutical companies that manufacture these drugs.149 Some litigants
are claiming that they were deceived or defrauded by pharmaceutical
companies regarding the safety of these drugs.150 They are now seeking
relief under state consumer fraud statutes.151 These consumers point to
specific promotional language used by drug companies to describe and
market their products.152
State attorneys general, government entities, and consumers across the
nation have brought actions under consumer fraud statutes. In June 2017,
Oklahoma Attorney General Mike Hunter filed a lawsuit in state court
against four manufacturers of opioid pain medication¾ Purdue Pharma,
Allergan, Cephalon, and Janssen Pharmaceuticals¾ alleging that their
deceptive marketing practices played a part in causing the state’s current
opioid epidemic.153 Several counties in New York also sued opioid
manufacturers after hiring a private law firm to prosecute the matter, with
Suffolk County being the most recent county to file as of August 2016.154
New York’s counties allege that the named drug manufacturers utilized
deceptive practices in their promotion and advertisement of the drugs’
effectiveness and safety in pain management.155
New Hampshire also filed a suit against Purdue Pharma concerning its
opioid marketing practices.156 Specifically, the state alleges that Purdue
146

Id.
Schwartz, Talarico, and Ciavarra, supra note 34.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Schwartz, Talarico, and Ciavarra, supra note 34; see also, Press Release, Oklahoma
Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Mike Hunter files Lawsuit against four
Opioid Manufacturers (June 30, 2017).
154 Schwartz, Talarico, and Ciavarra, supra note 34.
155 Id.
156 Nate Raymond, New Hampshire sues Purdue Pharma over opioid marketing
practices, Reuters (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-hampshirepurdue/new-hampshire-sues-purdue-pharma-over-opioid-marketing-practicesidUSKBN1AO29W.
147
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Pharma engaged in deceptive marketing practices through its promotion of
OxyContin, which played a significant part in creating the state’s severe
opioid crisis.157 Such practices include significantly downplaying the risk of
addiction to OxyContin, as well as overstating the drug’s benefits to longterm pain treatment.158 New Hampshire’s lawsuit follows similar cases
against Purdue Pharma and other drug makers in Oklahoma, Mississippi,
Ohio, and Missouri, as well as several cities and counties in California,
Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and New York.159
New Jersey’s former attorney general, Christopher Porrino, followed
the trend and initiated a four-count lawsuit against Arizona-based
pharmaceutical manufacturer Insys Therapeutics in October 2017.160 In its
report on the suit, the Bergen Record asserted:
New Jersey joins a growing number of states taking legal action
against manufacturers of the drugs at the heart of a national
epidemic. More than two dozen cities, counties, and states have
filed suits against drug companies alleging deceptive marketing
practices and understating the addictive effects of drugs like
OxyContin, Duragesic and Percoset.161
Porrino alleged that Insys pushed fentanyl prescriptions (a synthetic,
highly-potent opioid) to a broader population, and at higher doses, than
approved by the FDA.162 In doing so, he alleged that the company violated
both the NJCFA and the New Jersey False Claims Act.163
Aside from actions by state attorneys general, individual opioid-related
causes of action have been brought against pharmaceutical companies under
state consumer protection laws.164 For example, the plaintiff in Bayless v.
Purdue Frederick Co., Inc.165 asserted a claim against Purdue Pharma under
the Connecticut Products Liability Act. Ms. Bayless was originally
prescribed OxyContin for back pain but quickly developed an addiction that
157

Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 Dustin Racioppi, N.J. sues opioid drugmaker Insys over its role role in deadly
epidemic, THE BERGEN RECORD (Oct. 6, 2017), http://www.northjersey.com/story/news/newjersey/2017/10/05/nj-sues-opioid-drugmaker-insys-over-its-role-deadly-epidemic/
733854001/.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. (alleging that Insys “‘routinely’ misled consumers by falsely representing that
doctors were prescribing Subsys based on their unbiased, independent clinical judgment. But
that clinical judgment had been ‘co-opted based on Insys’s unlawful payment of kickbacks to
prescribers.’”)
164 Richard C. Ausness, Prescription Drug Abuse: The Law’s Struggle to Address an
Epidemic: The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA.
L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2014).
165 No. FSTCV095012157, 2011 WL 6117927 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2011).
158
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led to her filing for bankruptcy and attempting suicide.166 While the Superior
Court of Connecticut denied Purdue’s motion for summary judgment
because questions of fact existed regarding the statute of limitations and
proximate cause, the case was never decided on the merits of the Connecticut
Products Liability Act.167
Plaintiffs harmed by opioids have also brought class action lawsuits
against manufacturers under consumer fraud statutes.168 For example, a class
action was brought against Purdue Pharma in Missouri alleging, in part, a
violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.169 Plaintiffs claimed
that Purdue’s marketing tactics were aggressive, misleading, and coercive in
depicting OxyContin as an “all purpose” pain reliever and in persuading
physicians and pharmacists to overprescribe the drug.170
In Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., the plaintiffs filed a class action
alleging violations of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection
Procedures Act for deceptive advertising.171 The class claimed that Purdue
deceptively advertised OxyContin as a superior pain reliever, lasting longer
than competing opioid painkillers.172 However, later studies showed that
OxyContin did not last longer than less expensive alternatives, leading
plaintiffs to allege that they were injured by paying a higher price as a result
of Purdue’s advertising campaign.173 Consumers of OxyContin in Kentucky
filed a similar class action against Purdue claiming, among other causes of
action, a violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.174
The aforementioned claims, filed against opioid manufactures by either
individual plaintiffs, classes of plaintiffs, or state attorneys general, show
that the public intends to hold opioid manufactures responsible for the public
health crisis now crippling all levels of American society. This case law also
shows that consumer fraud statutes provide a potential avenue for holding
such entities responsible for their wrongdoings.
B. The Potential Impact of Opioid Litigation on New Jersey’s
Pharmaceutical Industry and Judicial System
An increase in opioid-related consumer fraud litigation would have a
profoundly negative impact on New Jersey’s already-overburdened judicial
166

Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *33. There is no subsequent history available regarding this action.
168 Ausness, supra note 164, at 1137.
169 Campbell v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1:02 cv 00163 TCM, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31173, *8–9 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
170 Id. at *7–8.
171 Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp.2d 171, 172 (D.D.C. 2003).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 172–73.
174 Salisbury v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 166 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
167
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system. New Jersey’s consumer fraud lawsuits have increased substantially
in recent history.175 The number of reported decisions under the NJCFA
have increased 447% from 2000 to 2009.176 Not only is this figure staggering
in its own right, but it is also far greater than the national average.177
Unfortunately, these figures are likely underestimated, since they include
only reported decisions.178 Such statistics omit actions filed, actions settled,
or actions whose decisions were unreported.179
These statistics and data support the notion that a broad interpretation
of the NJCFA has placed a substantial burden on the state court system.180
This increase in consumer litigation is linked to the incentives consumers
face when filing under the NJCFA: “Consumers respond rationally to
litigation incentives, and states that invite additional consumer protection
litigation through imprecise standards, low burdens of proof, and more
generous awards ought not be surprised when enterprising lawyers initiate
more litigation, whether meritless or not.”181
Interpreting the NJCFA broadly to allow out-of-state consumers to sue
New Jersey-based companies for transactions occurring outside the state will
also have a destructive effect on one of the state’s largest economic sectors:
the pharmaceutical industry.182 Known for decades as “The Medicine Chest
of the World,” New Jersey is home to seventeen of the world’s twenty largest
pharmaceutical companies.183 Such companies include, among others,
Novartis, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., Novo Nordisk, and Bayer
Healthcare.184 Further supporting the fact that New Jersey is the epicenter
of the global pharmaceutical industry is the fact that New Jersey is the site
of 2,200 active or open clinical trials.185
In New Jersey, the pharmaceutical industry is big business. Statistics

175

Shepherd, supra note 1, at 12.
Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. See also, Bluebook Guide: Unpublished Opinions, GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY
(Nov. 17, 2018, 12:07 AM), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=261289&p=2339386
(“[O]nly a small percentage of cases are actually designated for publication by a court and
published in a reporter. Many cases are unpublished, but still available in databases, such
as Westlaw, Lexis, Bloomberg Law, or elsewhere.”)
179 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis added).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 13.
182 New Jersey’s Life Sciences: By the Numbers, HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE OF NEW JERSEY
(Nov. 17, 2018, 12:21 AM), http://hinj.org/life-sciences-new-jersey/by-the-numbers/ (stating
that the “total economic output supported by the biopharmaceutical sector in New Jersey . . .
represented eighteen percent of New Jersey’s 2014 gross domestic product.”).
183 NJ & Pharmaceuticals: New Jersey Leads the World, supra note 35.
184 Id.
185 Id.
176
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put into perspective what a crucial and substantial role the pharmaceutical
industry plays in New Jersey’s overall economy.186 As of early 2017, 3,100
life sciences entities operate in New Jersey.187
In 2015, the
biopharmaceutical sector’s total direct impact on the New Jersey economy
was $42.9 billion.188 The industry’s indirect or “spin-off” economic activity
in that same year contributed an additional $61.9 billion to the state’s
economy.189 The total economic output supported by the biopharmaceutical
sector in 2014 amounted to $81.7 billion, which consisted of 19.9% of the
state’s total GDP for that year.190
The pharmaceutical industry is such a critical part of New Jersey’s
economy that the state structures its tax code to benefit pharmaceutical
companies and attract more to the state.191 In fact, a new state policy
increased the allowable research and development tax credit to 100% of a
company’s corporate tax liability.192 This tax incentive is especially
attractive to pharmaceutical companies, considering the immense amount of
time, energy, and capital expended on research and development (“R&D”)
for creating new drugs and bringing them to market. Such a strong incentive
created by the state to attract and retain these companies could very well be
undercut by the risk of nationwide consumer fraud litigation under the
NJCFA. Pharmaceutical companies may decide that the risk of such costly
litigation could outweigh New Jersey’s R&D tax benefits.
Many New Jersey citizens are also directly employed by the
biopharmaceutical industry, or benefit from it, either directly or indirectly.193
It is estimated that 89,500 jobs in the state are directly connected to the
biopharmaceutical and medical devices industries.194 This number increases
to 440,000 when considering jobs that are indirectly supported by these
sectors.195 Therefore, 10.3% of all jobs in the state relate to the

186

New Jersey’s Life Sciences: By the Numbers, supra note 182.
Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 The Medicine Chest of the World, BIO NJ (Sept. 14, 2018, 12:38 PM),
https://bionj.org/membership/medicine-chest-of-the-world. (“The success of biotechnology
in New Jersey is due largely to a supportive state government and its innovative programs and
policies. A prime example is the Technology Business Tax Certification Transfer Program.
This program provides a new source of monies to small and mid-sized biotechnology
companies by allowing them to sell net operating loss credits to profitable companies for
cash.”).
192 NJ & Pharmaceuticals: New Jersey Leads the World, supra note 35.
193 New Jersey’s Life Sciences: By the Numbers, supra note 182.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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biopharmaceutical and medical devices sectors, directly or indirectly.196 One
in ten New Jersey residents are economically associated with these
industries.197
While it is clear that New Jersey citizens benefit greatly from the jobs
created by the state’s pharmaceutical industry, the state itself benefits as
well. In 2015, New Jersey received a total of $7.7 billion in personal taxes
paid by New Jersey employees in they the biopharmaceutical sector.198
The pharmaceutical industry’s critical position in the state’s economy
is also evident through New Jersey’s continued efforts to expand and
strengthen it.199 In August 2017, “three pharmaceutical manufacturers
received nearly [two] million [dollars] in combined Grow New Jersey
incentives from the state Economic Development Authority.”200 As a result,
pharmaceutical company Geri-Care is expected to bring more than 130 new
jobs to the state, and is projected to spend $1.3 million on expansion of its
manufacturing capabilities.201
Likewise, Aptapharma, another
pharmaceutical company is also investing $4.9 million in upgrading its
Camden site, which will create thirty-five new positions in New Jersey.202
While the Act’s detrimental effects on the state’s courts and
pharmaceutical industry support the notion it should be curtailed in scope, it
should be noted that extraterritorial application of the NJCFA harms New
Jersey residents and businesses as well. The increase in NJCFA-based
litigation is not necessarily benefiting those the New Jersey Legislature
intended to assist.203 For instance,”[ninety-three] percent of plaintiffs suing
pharmaceutical companies in [NJ]CFA class actions do not . . . reside in
New Jersey.”204 The Act intended to benefit “downtrodden consumers
finally vindicating economically-small but significant claims against
uncaring businesses.”205 Instead, partly due to the Act’s broad interpretation,
sophisticated litigants are taking advantage of “low burdens of proof and
generous remedial provisions” to profit off of New Jersey businesses.206 As
a result, these businesses raise prices to compensate for costs they face in
196

Id.
Id.
198 Id.
199 Eric Strauss, EDA approves $2M in annual incentives for trio of pharma firms, NJBIZ
(Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.njbiz.com/article/20170808/NJBIZ01/170809844/eda-approves2m-in-annual-incentives-for-trio-of-pharma-firms (emphasis omitted).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Ruggiero & Stein, supra note 27.
204 Id.
205 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 13.
206 Id. at 13–14.
197
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defending such consumer fraud suits, which harm New Jersey consumers in
the long run.207
The issue of significantly increased costs businesses face is
compounded by the fact that they incur litigation costs for defending against
consumer fraud claims, whether valid or not.208 New Jersey businesses are
also burdened by attorneys’ fees because of the ease at which the NJCFA
allows plaintiffs to recover these fees.209 While these increased “costs are
initially borne by [New Jersey] businesses, they are passed on to [New
Jersey] consumers through increased prices, fewer innovations, lower
product quality, lower wages, and lower employment.”210
The effects of economic prices paid by both businesses and consumers
are especially problematic for the pharmaceutical industry. It is important to
consider the high research and development costs faced by pharmaceutical
companies.211 Pharmaceutical companies often justify the high price of US
prescription drugs based on high R&D costs.212 Many consumers already
struggle to afford drugs necessary for their health and well-being, and an
increase in costs for pharmaceutical companies would only increase the
burdens that consumers already face.213 A decrease in innovation would also
207 Id. at 12–14 (“Both data and theory prove that excessive increases in litigation . . . is
a direct consequence of the perverse incentives [the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act]
creates . . . . [S]ophisticated litigants predictably exploit low burdens of proof and generous
remedial provisions to extract rents from businesses, raising prices, and ultimately harming
local consumers . . . . Although these costs are initially borne by businesses, they are
ultimately passed on to consumers through increased prices, fewer innovations, lower product
quality, lower wages, and lower employment.”).
208 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 14.
209 Id. at 10.
210 Id. at 14.
211 Matthew Herper, The Cost Of Developing Drugs Is Insane. That Paper That Says
Otherwise Is Insanely Bad, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
matthewherper/2017/10/16/the-cost-of-developing-drugs-is-insane-a-paper-that-arguedotherwise-was-insanely-bad/ (“The amount spent to develop any individual drug depends
mostly on what it costs to conduct studies to prove it is safe and effective to secure regulatory
approval. That can range from $10 million to $2 billion, depending on what the drug is used
for.”).
212 Nancy L. Yu, Zachary Helms, & Peter B. Bach, R&D Costs For Pharmaceutical
Companies Do Not Explain Elevated US Drug Prices, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059036/full/. While the main
thrust of this article states that pharmaceutical companies price drugs higher than necessary
to cover research and development costs, it also states that pharmaceutical companies
commonly justify their high US pricing scheme on high research and development costs.
213 Most Say They Can Afford Their Prescription Drugs, But One In Four Say Paying Is
Difficult, Including More Than Four In Ten People Who Are Sick, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION (Aug, 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/most-say-theycan-afford-their-prescription-drugs-but-one-in-four-say-paying-is-difficult-and-more-thanfour-in-ten-for-people-who-are-sick/ (“[A]bout a quarter [of individuals] (24%) say paying
for their drugs is difficult, and the share facing difficulties rises among those with low incomes
(33%) or currently taking four or more prescription drugs (38%), and is highest for those in
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negatively affect these companies and the consumers who rely on their
products, as they would not be able to discover new treatments and therapies
for diseases. Finally, lower wages and lower employment would be
especially damaging for New Jersey, considering that pharmaceutical
industry employs a significant number of the state’s citizens.214
The disadvantages created by interpreting the NJCFA too broadly,
including applying it extraterritorially, are clearly against the intentions of
the New Jersey Legislature.215 “While the Legislature expressly sought to
create a consumer-friendly statute, it surely could not have meant to
encourage forum-shopping among attorneys nor nationwide class actions
against New Jersey businesses.”216 This unintended interpretation of the Act
has had the result of discouraging business owners from operating in New
Jersey, which in turn has decreased the number of jobs and revenue within
the state.217
C. The Need for an Amendment to Prevent Consumer Fraud Claims
by Non-Residents for Out-of-State Transactions
As opioid litigation becomes more frequent, many of the negative
externalities that New Jersey will face can be addressed by amending the
NJCFA to limit consumer fraud actions to in-state transactions.218
“Eliminating the possibility of extraterritorial application will deter
professional consumer litigators from drumming up nationwide class actions
in hope of taking advantage of New Jersey’s indulgent [NJCFA]
provisions.”219
Such an amendment would not only bring the NJCFA back in line with
the original intent of the Legislature to protect New Jersey consumers but
would also protect the state’s businesses and economy. As previously
mentioned, the NJCFA’s legislative history indicates that it was designed to
protect New Jersey consumers, not to allow consumers outside of the state
to sue New Jersey-based businesses for transactions occurring outside of the
state.220 Clarification that these types of actions are impermissible under the
NJCFA, through an amendment to the Act, will protect both New Jersey’s
fair or poor health (43%).”); see also, Howard LeWine, M.D., Millions of adults skip
medications due to their high cost, HARVARD HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 30, 2015),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/millions-skip-medications-due-to-their-high-cost201501307673.
214 New Jersey’s Life Sciences: By the Numbers, supra note 182.
215 Ruggiero & Stein, supra note 27.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 18.
219 Id.
220 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11.
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businesses and the state’s overall economy.221
An amendment that would have addressed this very issue was first
proposed in 2010.222 New Jersey Assembly Bill 3333 was introduced to the
Assembly Committee on Consumer Affairs on October 7, 2010, and New
Jersey Senate Bill 2855 was introduced to the Senate Committee on
Commerce on May 12, 2011.223 Neither bill progressed further than
introduction to their respective committees, as they were never voted on or
even discussed thereafter.224 Generally, the bills proposed “revise[]
individual cause[s] of action under [the] consumer fraud act and make[]
certain other revisions regarding the applicability of the act.”225
The drafters of the amendment noted that the Act in its current form,
“does not place jurisdictional limits on the events giving rise to claims that
consumers can bring under the [A]ct.”226 A section of the proposed
amendment sought to modify this issue with the NJCFA by limiting the
application of the statute to “claims arising out of transactions that occurred
in the state.”227 Doing so would greatly decrease the number of consumer
fraud claims filed in New Jersey, including nationwide class actions.228
An amendment similar to the one proposed by N.J. A.B. 3333 and N.J.
S.B. 2855 has recently been introduced by the New Jersey Legislature in
2018.229 Such a bill would significantly reduce the threat that opioid
litigation poses to the state. As previously stated, this amendment would
limit the application of the NJCFA to New Jersey residents or transactions
occurring in New Jersey.230 Explicitly stating that the Act is limited in its
extraterritorial application would clarify that its purpose is to protect New
Jersey consumers.231
It is critical that the Legislature pass this bill, as such an amendment
would strike a balance between protecting New Jersey’s vital pharmaceutical
industry while still allowing out-of-state consumers an avenue for suit when
appropriate. This amendment would prevent an onslaught of consumer fraud
litigation by consumers against pharmaceutical companies headquartered or
based in New Jersey under the consumer-friendly NJCFA. However, outof-state consumers would still be able to seek relief against New Jersey221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
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214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010–2011).
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Id.
Id.
Ruggiero & Stein, supra note 27, at 3.
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A.B. 303, 2018 Leg., 218th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
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Shepherd, supra note, 1 at 18.
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based companies in contract or tort actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Precluding consumer fraud opioid litigation from proliferating within
the state by amending the NJCFA is critical to protect New Jersey’s
pharmaceutical industry, courts system, consumers, and residents.
Continuing to allow out-of-state consumers to sue companies based in the
state for transactions that do not occur within the state will create a great
harm as opioid litigation increases across the country. It is extremely likely
that the consumer-friendly construction and interpretation of the NJCFA will
result in forum-shopping among opioid litigants, who will select New Jersey
as the most favorable venue to bring their case.

